

**DRAFT**  
**NSC BRIEFING**

~~SECRET~~

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## **IMPLICATIONS OF EGYPTIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN AXIS**

### **I. Motives:**

**A. New Egyptian-Saudi axis is prompted by mutual interest in creating center of strength to attract other Arab states away from Western-supported Turkish-Pakistani pact and to present a unified front for dealings with the West.**

#### **1. Egyptian Motives:**

- a. Desire to dominate any regional defense organization which may come into being. Reflected in Egyptian insistence all Arabs refrain from defense plans with West until after Suez settlement.**
- b. Rivalry with Iraq for leadership of Arabs and fear "Northern Tier" defense plans based on Turkish-Pakistani pact favor Iraq and isolate Egypt.**

#### **2. Saudi Motives:**

- a. King Saud's desire assume role of Arab leader--**

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- b. Adoption of increasing non-co-operative attitude with West.
- c. Fear of possible Iraq-Jordan union--particularly if Iraq's position strengthened by Western arms.
- d. Strong anti-British sentiment resulting from Buraimi dispute and desire alignment with powerful neighbor.


## II. Aims:

### A. New Alignment is reported to provide for:

1. Creation of unified command of Egyptian and Saudi armed forces and joint defense plans.
2. Standardization of Saudi arms with Egypt and construction of arms and ammunition plants in Saudi Arabia.
3. Egyptian military mission to train Saudi army.
4. Mutual defense arrangements--eventually to include Yemen and the Sudan.

### B. To attract Jordan and possibly Lebanon into direct cooperation.

prime minister has also appeared.



G. To present a united stand in the Arab League and toward the West for "unsettled" questions.

### III. Implications

A. Importance of the axis is political rather than military.

Unlikely that the military aspect of axis will be implemented.

1. Egypt not in position to make notable contribution to Saudi armed forces.

2. Saudi army negligible as modern force, e.g. possesses only 12 light artillery guns.

B. Egyptian-Saudi pressure can be expected on Iraq through Arab League and other diplomatic channels to prevent its joining Turkish-Pakistani pact.

C. Increased propaganda against any Arab state aligning itself with the West and promotion of the Arab League collective

D. Newly formed axis might, however, disappear with settlement of Suez base. Egypt would then be more inclined to work with West in order to obtain military assistance. Would probably permit Saudi Arabia to drift alone.